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Abstract. - We propose a consensus opinion model based on the evolutionary game. In our
model, both of the two connected agents receive a benefit if they have the same opinion, otherwise
they both pay a cost. Agents update their opinions by comparing payo?s with neighbors. The
opinion of an agent with higher payoff is more likely to be imitated. We apply this model in scale-
free networks with tunable degree distribution. Interestingly, we find that there exists an optimal
ratio of cost to benefit, leading to the shortest consensus time. Qualitative analysis is obtained
by examining the evolution of the opinion clusters. Moreover, we find that the consensus time
decreases as the average degree of the network increases, but increases with the noise introduced
to permit irrational choices. The dependence of the consensus time on the network size is found to
be a power-law form. For small or larger ratio of cost to benefit, the consensus time decreases as
the degree exponent increases. However, for moderate ratio of cost to benefit, the consensus time
increases with the degree exponent. Our results may provide new insights into opinion dynamics
driven by the evolutionary game theory.
Introduction. – The dynamics of opinion sharing
and competing and the emergence of consensus have be-
come an active topic of recent research in statistical and
nonlinear physics [1]. One of the most successful method-
ologies used in opinion dynamics is agent-based model-
ing. The idea is to construct the computational devices
(known as agents with some properties) and then simu-
late them in parallel to model the real phenomena. In
physics this technique can be traced back to Monte Carlo
simulations. A number of agent-based models have been
proposed, which include the voter model [2], the majority
rule-model [3,4], the bounded-confidence model [5] and the
social impact model [6]. Some models display a disorder-
order transition [7–12], from a regime in which opinions
are arbitrarily diverse to one in which most individuals
hold the same opinion. Other models focus the emergence
of a global consensus [13–18], in which all agents finally
share the same opinion.
In this Letter, we propose an opinion model based on the
evolutionary game. Evolutionary game theory as a power-
ful mathematical framework, has been widely used to un-
derstand cooperative behavior [19,20], traffic flow [21,22],
epidemic spreading [23,24] and so on. However, to the best
of our knowledge, the impact of evolutionary games on the
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formation of public opinion has received little attention.
In fact, it is natural for us to consider different opinions
as different strategies. Individuals with different opinions
compete with each other and gain the corresponding pay-
offs. We assume that both of the two connected individ-
uals receive a benefit if they have the same opinion, oth-
erwise they both pay a cost. The above assumption has
been demonstrated by many psychological experiments in
which dissent often leads to punishment either psychologi-
cally or financially, or both, as human individuals attempt
to attain social conformity [25, 26].
In previous models, an individual usually follows the
opinion of a randomly chosen neighbor [2] or the majority
opinion in the neighborhood [3,4]. However, in our model
an individual updates its opinion by comparing payoffs
with a randomly selected neighbors. The more payoff of
the chosen neighbor has, with the higher probability of its
opinion will be imitated. Interestingly, we find that there
exists an optimal ratio of cost to benefit, leading to the
shortest consensus time.
Model. – Our model is described as follows. For a
given network of any topology, each node represents an
agent. Initially the two opinions denoted by the values
±1 are randomly assigned to agents with equal probability.
Both of the two connected agents receive a benefit b if they
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Fig. 1: (Color online) (a) The consensus time Tc as a function of the cost c for different values of the average degree of the
network 〈k〉. The network size N = 5000 and the noise κ = 1. (b) The consensus time Tc as a function of the cost c for different
values of the network size N . The average degree of the network 〈k〉 = 6 and the noise κ = 1. (c) The consensus time Tc as
a function of the cost c for different values of the noise κ. The network size N = 5000 and the average degree of the network
〈k〉 = 6.
have the same opinion, otherwise they both pay a cost c.
Thus, the total payoff of agent x can be calculated as
Px =
(b− c)kx
2
+
(b+ c)
∑
iǫΩx
SxSi
2
, (1)
where kx is the degree of agent x, Sx is the opinion of
agent x, and the sum runs over the nearest-neighbor set
Ωx of agent x.
Agents asynchronously update their opinions in a ran-
dom sequential order. At each time step, we randomly
select an agent x who obtains the payoff Px according to
Eq. (1). Then we choose one of agent x’s nearest neigh-
bors at random, and the chosen agent y also acquires its
payoff Py by the same rule. We suppose that the prob-
ability that agent x adopts agent y’s opinion is given by
the Fermi function [27–30]:
W (Sx ← Sy) =
1
1 + exp[(Px − Py)/κ]
, (2)
where κ characterizes the noise introduced to permit irra-
tional choices.
In the Fermi updating rule, the opinion of an agent with
higher payoff is more likely to be imitated. For Py > Px
(Py < Px), the probability that agent x adopts agent y’s
opinion is larger (smaller) than 0.5.
Results. – In all following simulations, we use the
Baraba´si-Albert scale-free networks [31] to study opinion
dynamics with the evolutionary game rules. Each data
point is based on 100 realizations of the network and 10
realizations on each network. To simplify, we set the ben-
efit from the common opinion as b = 1.
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Fig. 2: (a) The value of copt as a function of the average degree
of the network 〈k〉. The network size N = 5000 and the noise
κ = 1. (b) The value of copt as a function of the network size
N . The average degree of the network 〈k〉 = 6 and the noise
κ = 1. (c) The value of copt as a function of the noise κ. The
network size N = 5000 and the average degree of the network
〈k〉 = 6.
We define the consensus time Tc as the time steps re-
quired to reach the global consensus where all agents in a
network share the same opinion. Figure 1 shows that Tc
as a function of the cost c for different values of the aver-
age degree of the network 〈k〉, the network size N and the
noise κ. From Fig. 1, one can see that for given values of
other parameters, there exists an optimal value of c, here-
after denoted by copt, resulting in the shortest consensus
time Tc.
The value of copt changes with the average degree of the
network 〈k〉, the network size N and the noise κ. For given
p-2
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Fig. 3: (Color online) The number of opinion clusters Ncl as
a function of the rescaled time t/N for different values of the
cost c. The network size N = 5000, the average degree of the
network 〈k〉 = 6 and the noise κ = 1.
values of other parameters, copt decreases from 1.4 to 1.1
as 〈k〉 increases from 4 to 14 [see Fig. 2(a)]. The value of
copt decreases from 1.3 to 1.2 as N increases from 1000 to
20000 [see Fig. 2(b)], and copt increases from 1.2 to 1.6 as
κ increases from 0.2 to 20 [see Fig. 2(c)]. From Fig. 2, one
can also observe that the value of copt is more than the
benefit which is previously set to be 1.
Initially, the two competing opinions are randomly dis-
tributed among the population with the equal probabil-
ity. Thus, according to the mean-field theory, the ini-
tial payoff of agent x can be approximatively expressed as
Px(0) = (b− c)kx/2. For b > c, the initial payoff of agent
x increases with its degree. However, for b < c, Px(0)
decreases as the agent’s degree increases.
In scale-free networks a few nodes have high degrees
(usually are called as hubs), while most nodes are of low
degrees. It has been shown that the opinion dynamics
is proceeded by formation of some large opinion clusters
centered at hubs [32–35]. A opinion cluster is a connected
component (subgraph) fully occupied by nodes holding
the same opinion. Through the competition of different
opinion clusters, one cluster will invade the others and fi-
nally dominate the system with a global consensus. For
very large values of the cost c, initially the payoffs of
high-degree agents are much lower than that of low-degree
agents and the opinions of hubs have a very small probabil-
ity to be imitated. Thus it becomes difficult for agents to
form large opinion clusters centered at hubs. On the other
hand, for very small values of c, a hub has so strong influ-
ence on its low-degree neighbors that the cluster formed
by this hub is extremely stable. As a result, the merging
of different clusters become very difficult for too large c,
leading to a longer consensus time. Taken together, we can
expect that the shortest consensus time would be realized
at the moderate value of c.
To verify the above analysis, we study the number of
opinion clusters Ncl as the rescaled time t/N evolves for
different values of the cost c. From Fig. 3, one can see
that initially there exist hundreds of opinion clusters in
the network but Ncl eventually decreases to 1 as the time
evolves. For c = 5, initially Ncl decreases much more
slowly, compared with c = 0.1 and 1.2, indicating that it
is hard to form big opinion clusters when c is large. For
c = 0.1, Ncl decreases faster than the cases of c = 1.2 and
c = 5 in the early stage (t/N < 100). However, when only
a few clusters remain in the system, for example, Ncl < 40,
Ncl decreases very slowly for c = 0.1, indicating that the
competition among big opinion clusters becomes furious
when c is too small.
Finally, we investigate the effects of the average degree
of the network 〈k〉, the network size N and the noise κ on
the consensus time. From Fig. 4(a), we see that for a given
value of the cost c, the consensus time Tc decreases as 〈k〉
increases. The consensus time Tc scales as N
β with the
exponent β depending on the value of c [see Fig. 4(b)]. The
exponent β =1.19, 1.13, 1.15, correspond to c = 0.2, 1.2,
3 respectively. In particular, the optimal c = 1.2 results in
the lowest value of β. From Fig. 4(c), we also observe that
the consensus time Tc increases as the noise κ increases.
This phenomenon indicates that the more rational choice
(following the opinion of the agent with higher payoff) will
accelerate the formation of consensus.
Conclusions and discussions. – In conclusion, we
have proposed an opinion model based on the evolutionary
game. An agent receives a benefit if it has the same opin-
ion with a neighbor, otherwise it pays a cost. An agent
randomly selects a neighbors as a reference. The agent has
a higher (lower) probability to imitate the opinion of the
chosen neighbor if its payoff is lower (larger) than that of
the selected neighbor. The results in scale-free networks
show that, the shortest consensus time can be obtained
when the cost of conflicting opinions is a litter larger than
the benefit of common opinions. For very high ratio of
cost to benefit, initially hubs have so low payoffs that their
opinions are seldom imitated, which prevents the forma-
tion of large opinion clusters. On the other hand, too
low ratio of cost to benefit makes the merging of different
clusters become very difficult. Thus the shortest consen-
sus time must be realized at the moderate ratio of cost to
benefit.
The interplay between the opinion dynamics and the
evolutionary games is a very interesting topic. Previ-
ous studies have shown that the introduction of opin-
ion dynamics can greatly affect the evolution of cooper-
ation [36–40]. For example, Szolnoki and Perc discovered
that the spatial selection for cooperation is enhanced if an
appropriate fraction of the population chooses the most
common rather than the most profitable strategy within
the interaction range [36]. Yang et. found that coopera-
tion is promoted by punishing neighbors with the opposite
strategy [37]. Together previous and our works offer an un-
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Fig. 4: (Color online) (a) The consensus time Tc as a function of the average degree of the network 〈k〉 for different values of
the cost c. The network size N = 5000 and the noise κ = 1. (b) The consensus time Tc as a function of the network size N for
different values of the cost c. The average degree of the network 〈k〉 = 6 and the noise κ = 1. The fitted line has the slope 1.19,
1.13 and 1.15 for c = 0.2, 1.2 and 3 respectively. (c) The consensus time Tc as a function of the noise κ for different values of
the cost c. The network size N = 5000 and the average degree of the network 〈k〉 = 6.
derlying connection between the evolutionary games and
the opinion dynamics.
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